Burkina Faso’s security minister traveled to Tehran on November 12, 2025, for talks with Iranian officials. The visit led to the reopening of Burkina Faso’s embassy in Iran, new agreements on security cooperation, and discussions about enhancing ties in agriculture and industry.
This trip is part of a larger pattern as Iran seeks new partnerships amid growing isolation following the outbreak of war in Gaza in late 2023. The conflict was triggered by Hamas, a group aligned with and funded by Tehran. Since then, Iran has faced political and economic crises, with its regional alliances under strain due to Israeli military actions against groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, and the collapse of Syria’s Assad regime in 2024.
Iran’s difficulties escalated after a twelve-day war with Israel in June 2025 that included U.S. involvement. This was followed by the European Union reimposing United Nations “snapback” sanctions—measures that had previously been lifted after the 2015 nuclear deal.
Additionally, Iran is experiencing severe drought conditions affecting its capital city.
In response to these challenges, Iranian officials have sought to strengthen relationships elsewhere, notably in Africa. According to Eric Lob, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University: “As an expert on Iran’s foreign policy, I believe one key emergent area for this is Africa, where Iran has increased its outreach to historically dependable and strategically significant partners such as Burkina Faso.” He added: “This outreach has created important opportunities for Tehran to engage with countries on issues such as security and critical minerals, while also expanding its market for weapons and other exports while bypassing sanctions.”
Beyond Burkina Faso, Iran has expanded relations with other West African nations including Mali and Niger—countries that have experienced military coups since the early 2020s and distanced themselves from Western powers. These states face ongoing threats from rebels and jihadist groups. As a result—and similar to Ethiopia—they are turning toward Iran as a partner for arms supplies including drones.
For Tehran, deeper ties offer access to markets for metals like gold from Burkina Faso or Mali and uranium from Niger. Uranium could be especially valuable if damage sustained during recent conflicts compels Iran to rebuild or weaponize its nuclear program.
Iranian diplomatic activity has continued elsewhere on the continent. In April-May 2025 it signed economic and security deals with Niger—including an agreement for Tehran to purchase 300 tons of uranium for $56 million.
Meetings between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and his Malian counterpart occurred twice between May 2024 and October 2025; both sides agreed on joint economic commissions and mutual support at international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
From February through October 2025, bilateral meetings were held between Iran and Sierra Leone focused on deepening diplomatic ties; however Sierra Leone voted against lifting sanctions on Iran at the UN Security Council in September—a decision partly attributed to reliance on British aid.
Iran’s outreach extends beyond West Africa. Between October-November 2025 it coordinated with Malawi over importing aircraft despite sanctions restrictions. In August it worked toward closer security relations with South Africa—its largest trading partner in Africa—following controversial remarks by South African army chief Gen. Rudzani Maphwanya supporting Iran.
Between April-October there were also meetings with Zimbabwe covering economy, environment, and medical tourism agreements.
At an October Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Kampala attended by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, Araghchi thanked Uganda for condemning U.S. and Israeli actions during recent hostilities; he expressed interest in further cooperation particularly around agriculture commerce—and highlighted Uganda’s strategic importance due not only to uranium reserves but also cobalt needed for lithium batteries among other products.
Despite this intensified engagement across Africa—including attempts at circumventing international sanctions—Iran faces several constraints:
There remains competition from Middle Eastern rivals like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which continues strong trade relationships throughout sub-Saharan Africa.
African governments may hesitate before expanding ties given renewed global economic pressure linked both directly/indirectly back onto Tehran via snapback sanctions.
The transactional approach underlying much Iranian outreach could breed distrust among partners—as evidenced when drones supplied by Tehran reportedly reached Eritrea amidst rising tensions there vis-à-vis Ethiopia.
Lob concluded: “Time will tell whether the opportunities outweigh the constraints as Iran attempts to forge closer relations with the continent.” He noted: “Yet for government officials in Tehran weathering sundry crises at home and abroad, it will feel like they have few alternatives than to seek opportunities where they can find them.”
“Eric Lob, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University”
“This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.”
